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1. INTRODUCTION
As Hong Kong's sovereignty retrocession on July 1, 1997 is
only about one hundred days away, it is useful at this final hour
of the British sunset regime to review and reflect upon the legacy
of a century and a half of British colonial rule. A much celebrat-
ed British "gift" to Hong Kong has been the rule of law, including
a British-style common law system with an independent and
impartial judiciary supposedly delivering fair and equal justice to
all. In democratic societies, a basic requirement for public
confidence in the legal system is that it "is of fundamental
importance that justice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."1 Ideally, this
principle should be the hallmark of the common law system in
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Hong Kong under British administration.
To most people in Hong Kong, the preservation of the
existing legal system is of crucial importance to the high degree of
autonomy the post-colonial Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region ("S.A.R.") is supposed to enjoy under Chinese sovereignty
according to the "One Country, Two Systems" formula.'
However, this widely shared perception is flawed for one simple
reason: the legal system in Hong Kong today has its own serious
defects. It is not only alien in origin 3 and markedly different
from the legal system in the People's Republic of China
("P.R.C."), but also defective and inadequate. This Article argues
that extensive reform of the British-established common law
system is necessary to meet the requirements of contemporary
Hong Kong as a complex international community and to lay a
more solid foundation for the future Hong Kong S.A.R. under
P.R.C. sovereignty. Section 2 looks at the institutional defects in
the basic composition of the common law system in Hong Kong.
Section 3 explores the various improper actions of the various
colonial authorities. Section 4 discusses the misdeeds within the
judiciary itself - the body of individuals charged with upholding
the rule of law. Finally, section 5 concludes by speculating about
the ultimate effects of this tarnished common law heritage and
proposes steps necessary to assure the future success of the rule of
law in post-1997 Hong Kong.
2. INSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS
Although many observers feel that the general structure and
institutional composition of Hong Kong's legal system are
basically sound and smooth functioning,4 a major flaw has been
universal use of the English language. Until very recently all
court proceedings in both civil and criminal cases in Hong Kong
2 See generally David J. Clark, The Basic Law: One Document, Two Systems,
in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY" UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 21-25 (Ming K. Chan & David
J. Clark eds., 1991) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY?] (discussingthe
impact of China's repressive system on Hong Kong's "One Country Two
Systems" formula).
I The system is "alien in origin" to both traditional Chinese customary law
and the Qing code adopted when Hong Kong first came under British rule.
' See Clark, supra note 2, at 25 (quoting Hong Kong governor Sir David
Wilson's comments on the soundness of Hong Kong's legal system).
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were conducted in English. Although English is nominally an
official language, it is not the mother tongue nor the language of
everyday usage for the overwhelming majority of the local
populace.' At present, residents must speak English to be eligible
for jury service." This language qualification significantly affects
the composition of the Hong Kong jury, and creates tension with
contemporary ideas about the role of trial by jury. Thus, those
Hong Kong Chinese who appear on the "List of Common Jurors"
are likely to be better educated, middle class businessmen or
professionals with sufficient knowledge of English to understand
court proceedings Consequently, the jury in Hong Kong is not
representative of the society it purportedly serves. Any failure to
reform the jury franchise would create the risk that the jury
system could lose legitimacy among the public, even jeopardizing
its continued existence under a different sovereign with a Leninist-
Stalinist legal system and legal culture.
A parallel concern is the delayed and inadequate progress of
bilingual (English and Chinese) codification, with more than 200
laws originally passed in English still lacking official Chinese
translations.8 Part of the problem of this "justice in the English
language" stems from the personnel in the legal system. The
institutions of justice are still dominated by expatriates at the
senior ranks in both the Legal Department (including the
Attorney General's Chamber)and the judiciary where the
government's personnel localization efforts have yielded only
limited results.' This failure is partly attributable to a lack of
conscientious effort in the recruitment and training of legal
personnel. True localization of the common law would require
long term and far-sighted reform which could strengthen the rule
of law by making the entire legal system more attuned to the
I See Cliff Buddle, Rapid Changes "Threaten Justice'; S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 14, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Buddle, Rapid Changes] (emphasizing "the
ability to speak Chinese" as a necessity to the practice of law. In actuality,
most residents of Hong Kong speak Cantonese in their everyday lives.
6 See PETER DUFT, ET AL., JURIES: A HONG KONG PERSPECTIVE 53 (1992).
2 See id. at 54. Of the 143,798 names on the 1987 "List of Common
Jurors," two-thirds of them are Chinese and the remainder are mainly
European, Australian and North American. See id. at 56.
8 See Buddle, Rapid Changes, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the problems
attendant to delay in the translation process).
9 See id.
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demographic and socio-cultural realities as well as the rising
democratic and human rights consciousness of the local Chinese
populace. This much needed Sinification would help to consoli-
date the common law culture and institutions for the S.A.R.'
Despite repeated promises of rapid and full-scale localization
of senior legal personnel on both the judicial bench and in the
Legal Department' this still remains an empty slogan of the
sunset colonial regime. Even now locals fill less than half of the
senior posts in the Legal Department and only fifty-one percent
of the judiciary.12 Thus, it is not surprising that the local
lawyers' organizations strongly rejected former Governor David
Wilson's attempted explanation of the delayed localization
process." In his speech to the International Bar Association on
September 30, 1991, the Governor acknowledged that "most of
Hong Kong's judges and magistrates are expatriates, despite
considerable efforts to encourage localization." 14 He maintained
that this was because of qualified local lawyers' unwillingness to
forsake lucrative private practice for public legal service."
However, a major factor has been the government's own repeated
patterns of discrimination against local legal officials and magis-
trates/judges in promotion and terms of remuneration favoring
expatriates. 6 Another crucial factor is the tarnished reputation of
the official legal establishment itself which has rendered the bench
or the Legal Department Chambers an unattractive career prospect
for many of Hong Kong's legal talents.1
7
10 Examples of recent advocates for reform and education of the legal
profession are abundant. See, e.g., Anthony Dicks, Will the Laws Converge?, in
TiE CHALLENGE BEYOND 1997 - THE HONG KONG LECTURE (University
of Hong Kong, Center of Asian Studies Series No. 4, Siu-lun Wong ed.,
forthcoming 1997).
" See Making Justice Seem a Good Career Move, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 8, 1991, at 26 [hereinafter Career Move] (discussing attempts to recruit local
lawyers to serve in the judiciary).
12 See Buddle, Rapid Changes, supra note 5, at 1.
13 See Career Move, supra note 11, at 26 (noting the "angry response" from
the local bar association).
14 Idi
15 See id. (discussing Wilson's remark regarding "the enormous earning
power of the territory's most talented lawyers).
16 See Career Move, supra note 11, at 26 (explaining that efforts to attract
local judges and magistrates have been "turned down flat").
" See Career Move, supra note 11, at 26 (stating that a "number of scandals"
and challenges to landmark decisions have caused disillusionment with the
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The use of Chinese in legal proceedings with Chinese profi-
cient lawyers, judges, and juries will also promote greater
efficiency and perhaps help reduce the high cost of legal services
in Hong Kong. Translation between Chinese and English
currently consumes considerable time and effort in cases involving
non-English speakers." To the extent that the high cost of legal
services decreases access to the legal system and thus infringes on
the notion of "equal justice to all," the use of Chinese in the legal
system would enhance the delivery of justice, especially to those
who cannot afford the high cost associated with overcoming
language barriers. In terms of monetary expenditures, time
consumption, and professional manpower efforts, the divergence
of legal language and common language poses serious concerns.
There are, however, considerable difficulties in achieving a
genuinely fair and equitable bilingual legal system for post-colonial
Hong Kong. In the most recent ceremonial opening of the new
legal year under British rule on January 13, 1997, legal leaders
warned against rushing to make the legal system more bilingual
before the hand-over. Chairman of the Bar Gladys Li has noted
that the use of English and Chinese versions of the same laws
could lead to two streams of jurisprudence - each based in a
different language."9 She cautioned that "the common law
should not be eroded by the use of Chinese and the problems
caused by bilingual legislation."2" She added that "[n]o one will
thank us if in the rush to beat the deadline of July 1, we damage
the fabric of our legal system."
21
Law Society President Christopher Chan asserted, "[t]he fear
held by many is that a wholesale swing towards the use of the
Chinese language throughout all our courts will eventually lead to
the abandonment of the common law system.""
The head of the judiciary, Acting Chief Justice Noel Power,
agreed that the creation of a bilingual system is a formidable task
but said, "[w]e have no doubt that our measured and pragmatic
judiciary).
" See Crisis in the Courts, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 19, 1991, at 1
(discussing lawyers' discomfort with the present translation problems).
'9 See Buddle, Rapid Changes, supra note 5, at 1.
20 Neil Western, Localization Rush "Fraught With Danger", HONG KONG
STANDARD, Jan. 14, 1997, at 1.
21 Buddle, Rapid Changes, supra note 5, at 1.
2Id.
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approach will succeed."' Yet, "[i]t must be done so that it does
not, in any way, derogate from the capability of the courts to
apply the common law."24
There is no doubt that the language discrepancy is a serious
challenge in Hong Kong's uneasy transition to Chinesesovereign-
ty. The open acknowledgment of past inadequacies and future
obstacles, however, represents a conmitment to address and
resolve this long existing institutional defect in the common law
heritage the British will leave behind. As British legal scholar
Roger Cotterrell commented, "more fundamental still for the
future of the Common Law system may be the issue of language.
As Chinese replaces English as the language of Hong Kong law,
the difficulty of maintaining this legal system within an interna-
tional Common Law family must surely become acute. " '
The British legal legacy in Hong Kong also harbors rulings
reflecting dangerous examples of an undemocratic colonial polity
that set unhealthy precedents for the future of the S.A.R. Con-
cerns of this nature encompass the thick piles of discriminatory
legislation (mostly racially based, anti-Chinese law passed by an
appointed, unrepresentative legislature) and draconian, biased (anti-
Chinese and anti-grassroots) court rulings which do not provide1 6
good examples of decency and fairness.
Another defect in the rule of law is the inadequate separation
of power between the executive branch and the judiciary under
the colonial polity. Until the 1950s, administrative officers in the
British regime served as magistrates trying cases in the police
court. ' Some of these officers specialized in law and subsequent-
ly became judges.2 ' For example, in the 1930s, Attorney General
2Id.
24 Id.
' Roger B. M. Cotterrell, Foreword to BERRY FONG-CHLUNG HSU, THE
COMMON LAW SYSTEM IN CHINESE CONTEXT: HONG KONG IN TRANSrTlON
viii (1992).
26 See generally Peter Wesley-Smith, Anti-Chinese Legislation in Hong Kong,
in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN,
1842-1992 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994) (discussing various examples of official anti-
Chinese activity).
7 See generally HONG KONG GOVERNMENT PRINTER, HONG KONG
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT CIVIL SERVICE LIST (1934) (citing many British
administrative officers working as police magistrates).
2' See generally id. (providing numerous examples of police magistrates
following this career path).
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Kemp went on to become the Chief Justice.29 More recently,
Denys Roberts moved from Attorney General to Chief Secretary
and then became Chief Justice until he retired in early 1988.30
There are many magistrates today who began their careers in the
legal department and went on to become judges such as Justice
Nazareth. 1  All such cross-over of executive branch personnel
into the judiciary does not enhance or create any perception of
the impartiality of the legal system.
The executive and legislative branches also reflect rather weak
separations of power with inadequate checks and balances. Until
1985, when indirectly elected seats were first introduced into the
Legislative Council ("Legco"), the colonial administration had
been able to pass legislation through a compliant legislature
comprised entirely of appointed members (with government
officials enjoying a majority until 1976).32 Thus, the colonial
regime often operated technically within the law, as it had always
been able to change the law through the appointed legislature. As
such the executive branch could always claim a valid basis for any
action that it wished to take. Moreover, when the administration
did not wish to seek the approval of Legco, it could resort to the
Emergency Regulations Ordinance of 1922."3  Emergency
29 See id. at 339-40 (providing a biographical sketch of Joseph Harsford
Kemp). From 1904 to 1908, Kemp occasionally acted in the capacity of a
Police Magistrate. From 1914 to 1930 he held the post of Attorney General.
Finally, from 1930 until his retirement in September 1933, he served as Chief
Justice. See id.
30 See WHO'S WHO IN HONG KONG 333 (Kevin Sinclair ed., 1984)
(documenting Denys Roberts' career).
11 See id. at 287 (listing Mr. Paul Nazarath as a Law Draftsman in the Legal
Department as of 1984). By 1988, Mr. Nazarath had ascended to the post of
High Court Judge. See WHO'S WHO IN HONG KONG 296 (Kevin Sinclair ed.,
4th ed. 1988). Most recently, Mr. Nazareth has served concurrently as a Justice
of Appeal and Vice President of the Court of Appeal. See HONG KONG
GOVERNMENT PRINTER, HONG KONG JUDICIARY 1994-1995 24 (1996)
[hereinafter HONG KONG JUDICIARY]. In addition, research has revealed that
38% of all post-World War II Hong Kong judges have served in the Legal
Department's criminal justice division. See Peter Wesley-Smith, TheJudiciary,
in INTRODUCTION TO THE HONG KONG CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 27, 31
(Mark S. Gaylord & Harold Traver eds., 1994).
32 See NORMAN MINERS, HONG KONG UNDER IMPERIAL RULE, 1912-1941
58-76 (1987) (discussing the generally acquiescent action of the Legislative
Council).
33 See PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW IN HONG KONG 157, 230 (1987) (discussing the "Henry VIII clause" of
1997]
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Regulations were not subject to disallowance or other checks in
London?' The Hong Kong government used this power freely
until 1972."5 These regulations were so draconian as to allow
imprisonment without trial and many other breaches of common-
ly accepted human rights.3" Yet, any such acts were considered
perfectly legal, and the courts dutifully enforced the regulations.
Because the Emergency Power Ordinance still remains in the
statute book, though all the regulations had been repealed by
1985,"s the serious risk remains that the S.A.R. government may
apply it in the same fashion as the colonial government.3"
3. QUESTIONABLE LEGAL ADMInTRATON
Besides institutional flaws and historical breaches, one can also
consider the colonial regime's own illegal official acts. Examples
include film censorship without proper legal authority' charac-
ter assassination, 41 as well as extra-legal maneuvers to undermine
or obstruct the course of justice.42 These actions all represent
the Emergency Regulations ordinance); W. S. Clarke, Freedom of Movement, in
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG 321, 336 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1988) (noting
the emergency restrictions in freedom of internal movement).
14 See Wesley-Smith, supra note 33, at 157 (noting that because any
enactment contrary to an emergency regulation is invalid, no rule contrary to
the regulation can have effect). However, if the decision that "an occasion of
p.. ublic danger has arisen," such that the Governor may use the emergency
ordinance, was not made in good faith, the courts may intervene." Id. at 157.
3 See id. (noting that the government used the ordinance during the civil
disorder of 1967).
36 See, e.g., Ada Yuen, Detainees Deprived of Basic Rights, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 1994, at 5 (discussing the inhumane treatment of
prisoners detained for lengthy periods of time without trial).
17 See Sinister Secrets of the House on the Hill, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 16, 1994, at 27.
38 See Johannes Chan, A Bill of Rights for Hong Kong?, in CIVIn LIBERTIES
IN HONG KONG, supra note 33, at 72, 82.
39 See Harsh Provision that Infringe Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 25, 1994, at 18.
40 Before the Hong Kong government's enactment of an ordinance on film
censorship in 1988, its film censorship had been without proper legal authority.
See MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG
KONG: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC LAW, 93-95, 108 (1990).
41 The regime's pressure tactics targeted pressure groups and politicians.
See ROBERT ADLEY, ALL CHANGE HONG KONG 68-71 (1984).
42 A prime example of London's executive interference with the Hong
Kong legal process is the Chinese government aircraft case in 1950. Under
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executive branch attempts to take politically expedient or
administrative short cuts amounting to a gross travesty of the rule
of law and obstructing all pursuits of true justice.
In more recent years, through critical junctures in Hong
Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty, a string of dubious
decisions, gross deficiency, and serious internal misdeeds have
punctuated the colonial regime's own record in legal administra-
tion. This deplorable condition has become particularly pro-
nounced since Attorney General Jeremy Matthews took office in
January 1988 as head of the Hong Kong Legal Department. The
following scenarios represent a selection of recent situations
illustrating some of the serious problems in legal administration.
These cases raise doubts about the executive branch's own regard
for the rule of law as well as the integrity and independence of the
judiciary.
3.1. Politically Motivated Prosecutions
In the aftermath of the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square events
when China-Hong Kong relations sharply deteriorated, the British
attempted to appease Beijing by bringing forth several politically
motivated prosecutions. For example, prosecutors brought a case
against several protesters outside a P.R.C. National Day reception
in late September 1989,4' and a case against political activists for
using a loudhailer44 without permits.45
In the first case the Hong Kong government failed to produce
adequate evidence to sustain its case thereby compelling dismissal
pressure from the United States, officials in London coerced authorities in
Hong Kong to keep military aircraft from falling into the hands of the
Communist regime in Beijing. See James T. H. Tang, World War to Cold War:
Hong Kong's Future and Anglo-Chinese Interactions 1941-55, in PRECARIOUS
BALANCE, supra note 26, at 107, 120-21.
4 See Corrina Tai, Four Appear Over National Day Protests, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1989, at 3.
4 "Loudhailer" is a colloquial word denoting various types of portable
voice amplification equipment.
41 See Rita Gomez, Loudhailer Prosecution Criticised, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 21, 1990, at 1 (noting that Legislative Councillor Martin Lee Chu-
ming criticized the decision to prosecute saying "[a] lot of people use
loudhailers without a permit. Why has the Attorney-General picked on the
liberals?").
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of the charges.46 However in an attempt to gather evidence
against the student protesters, the police raided Hong Kong's two
television stations and seized raw video footage of the demonstra-
tion outside the P.R.C. National Day celebration. 47 This highly
questionable preemptive action by the police provoked strong
local and international outcries and raised public doubts about the
executive arm's respect for freedom of the press.4' The govern-
ment's subsequent legal retreat seemed necessary to save itself
from greater blunder and further international embarrassment.
Additionally, after the protesters were arrested but before the case
went to trial, William Ehrman, Political Advisor to the Hong
Kong government, wrote to the New China News Agency (the
P.R.C.'s local official representative) containing assurances the
Hong Kong government had no intention of allowing Hong Kong
to become a "base of subversion" against P.R.C. authorities.49
This letter specifically mentioned the police actions taken against
local protesters as a concrete example of such official British
stance.
50
In the other case the prosecution won a conviction of the five
loudhailer defendants who were each fined HK$500.s1 In their
successful appeal, the Chief Justice ruled that because of a general
policy of not prosecuting persons who used noise amplifying
equipment the Crown could not suddenly, without notice, change
" See Daphne Cheng, April 5th Action Group to Suefor Damages, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 19, 1989, at 1 (quoting human rights expert Dr. Nihal
Jauwickram saying that the case was "dangerously close to representing political
persecution").
47 See Demandfor Review on TV Seizure, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
5, 1989, at 1 [hereinafter Demand for Review] (reporting that pro-democracy
groups believed the tapes were seized to help police identify individual
protestors for puroses of further persecution); Corrina Tai, Defence Seeks Video
Tapes of April Fifh Procession, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at 3
(reporting that the defense counsel in the criminal case sought to obtain these
tapes for evidentiary purposes).
" See Demand For Review, supra note 47, at 1 (noting that an association
of journalists had "demanded a full explanation of the incident").
41 See Britain Tells Hong Kong to Explain Letter Leak, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 29, 1989, at 1.
SO The letter was leaked to the press and provoked a storm of heavy
criticism against the colonial government. See Cheng, supra note 46, at 1
(noting the public response to the letter).
si See The King v. Li Wing Tat, [1990] Mag. App. 1286, 1288 (H.K. 1991).
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its policy and enforce the law.2 It seemed that in these two
cases the judicial bench served as an effective check to the
politically questionable decision of the Legal Department. As the
Attorney General is an ex officio member of the Executive
Council, his claim of being non-political in his legal decisions is
either naive or deliberately misleading. Few in the local commu-
nity accept his claim.
3.2. Prosecutions Timed to Send a Message
A second scenario involves the more recent colonial decision
to prosecute several protesters who staged a sit-in the reception
area inside the Japanese Consulate-General in Hong Kong on
October 9, 1996, amidst the "Protect the Diaoyu Islands"
movement protesting Japanese infringement on Chinese sovereign-
ty over these islands." The particular timing of the
government's announcement of prosecution raised disturbing
questions regarding the possible political considerations behind the
decision to prosecute.
The Commissioner of the Police announced this prosecution
on November 26, 1996, on the same day Hong Kong Governor
Christopher Patten arrived in Tokyo on an official visit to
Japan.' Among the October 9, 1996 protesters charged were
two Legco members, Albert C.Y. Ho and Kin-shing Tsang, both
members of the Democratic Party." It should be noted that
Tsang and several of his fellow October 9 protesters were also
actively involved in the November 15, 1996 protest against the
P.R.C.'s undemocratic selection of the first S.A.R. chief execu-
tive. 6 To some observers, the prosecution of the protestors'
12 See id. at 1290.
" See Stella Lee & No Kwai-Yan, Diaoyu Activists to Be Charged, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 27, 1996, at 1.
" See id. (reporting, on November 27, 1996, that the police were "working
on some procedures" of appropriate response against several individuals). In
most of such cases against demonstrators, it is the Legal Department's
responsibility to bring forth the prosecution, definitely not through an
announcement by the head of police. See Interview with Albert H. Y. Chen,
Dean of the University of Hong Kong School of Law, in Hong Kong (Mar. 5,
1997).
55 See id.
56 See Chris Yeung, Candidates in First Big Test, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 15, 1996, at 1 (noting that "various groups of activists" were preparing to
protest against the selection process).
1997]
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October 9 behavior might have seemed intended to serve to deter
similar activities at other S.A.R.-related events.
On November 26, 1996, the colonial regime also tabled for
Legco enactment an amendment to the Crimes Ordinance."7 This
amendment represents an effort to preempt the Basic Law's
Article 23 promise that "[t]he Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason,
secession, sedition, [or] subversion against the Central People's
Government."" While this British attempt to define "subversion
and sedition" only in terms of physical action (while protecting
the pure advocacy for such actions as free speech) had been
denounced by the P.R.C. as preempting the S.A.R.'s own law-
making prerogatives, the very timing of the prosecution of Ho,
Tsang and associates might have created an unfortunate public
perception of the colonial regime's realpolitik calculations behind
legal action to appease Tokyo and Beijing. 9
3.3. Administrative Disregard of Judicial Orders
Instead of full compliance with court orders, the executive
branch has displayed highhanded and inappropriate responses in
an attempt to obstruct and even reverse the causes of justice. This
is perhaps most evident in the case of habeas corpus application
by Vietnamese boat people against illegal detention in November
s See Cheuk-Fei Man, Hong Kong Government's Clumsy Handling of
Charges Against Anti-Japanese Protestors, HONG KONG ECON. J., Nov. 28, 1996,
at 26.
" Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzheng Qu Jiben Fa
[The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China], Apr. 4, 1990, ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO FALO FAGUI (Huoye) 1-4-0-1-i, art. 23, translated in [Special
Zones and Cities] China Laws for Foreign Bus. (CCH) 100-010 (1990)
[hereinafter Basic Law].
" See Man, supra note 57, at 21 (raising questions about the possible
motivations behind this series of actions).
Article 23 was included in the Basic Law only after the June 4, 1989 events
in Tiananmen Square. See Ming K. Chan, Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in
the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90, in BLUEPRINT FOR STABILI-
TY?, supra note 2, at 21-25 (discussing the final stages of Basic Law drafting in
late 1989 and early 1990); David J. Clark, The Basic Law: One Document, Two
Systems, in BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY?, supra note 2, at 41-42 (exploring the
implications of Article 23).
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1990.' In this case Justice Sears ruled that the detention of 111
Vietnamese boat people for eighteen months was illegal and
granted habeas corpus to release them.61 Notwithstanding the
explicit warning from Justice Sears, officials of the Immigration
Department rearrested the applicants right at the doorstep of the
court building only minutes after they were set free by the
court.62 Despite strong condemnation by the press and interna-
tional organizations of such defiance of court order, the Director
of Immigration still defended the legality of the original detention
of these boat people who were on their way to Japan through
Hong Kong waters.63
3.4. Ethically Questionable Conduct of Legal Department
Personnel
The professional conduct and personal behavior of some senior
officials in the Legal Department raises serious doubts in the
public mind about the competence, decency, and discipline of the
legal arm of the colonial regime. An example of such misconduct
is the case of Warwick Reid, Deputy Crown Prosecutor, who
absconded to Manila after an investigation revealed that he had
taken bribes for declining to prosecute certain cases.64 Reid was
finally caught in Manila and brought to trial in Hong Kong.6'
In the intervening period, investigators implicated another
member of the Legal Department who loaned his passport to Reid
for his escape.66 Still another colleague of Reid saw him at large
in Manila yet failed to inform the Legal Department.67 They
were all senior expatriate legal officers.68
o See In re Pham Van Ngo and 110 Others, [1990] Hc Mp No 3005 (H.K.
1990).
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See id.
6 See Corrina Tai, Reid Pleads Guilty to Corruption Charge, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 21, 1990, at 1.
65 See Rita Gomez, Lawyer Charged With Aiding Reid's Escape, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 21, 1990, at 1.
66 See id.
67 See Emily Lau, Lawyers in the Dock, FAR EASTERN EcON. REv., June 28,
1990, at 18-19.
62 See Gomez, supra note 65, at 1.
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A further example concerned Christopher Harris, Senior
Crown Counsel and second in charge of the Legal Department's
vice unit, who was convicted of soliciting an underage girl for
unlawful sex. 69 In this and other cases, the Legal Department
exhibited a reluctance to prosecute criminals within its own ranks.
The prosecution and trial of Christopher Harris were made
possible only after public pressure compelled Attorney General
Jeremy Matthews to reverse his earlier decision not to prose-
cute.70 The Attorney General's initial decision allowed Harris to
resign from the Department, and afterward to enter private
practice in Hong Kong, which Harris did in May 1989.7' These
cases raised serious doubts not only about the immoral and illegal
personal conduct of Harris while serving as a senior legal officer,
but it has also exposed the double standard resulting from internal
protection among the expatriate top brass in the Legal Depart-
ment. More critically, these cases highlight the sheer legal
incompetence and poor judgment of the Attorney General as the
chief legal advisor of the colonial regime and the titular head of
the local bar.
3.5. Improper Procedure in Appointing Magistrates
The Attorney General also failed to advise the colonial
administration concerning fundamental issues of lawful procedure
related to judicial appointment. This failure lead to a crisis in
April 1991. It came to light that sixty of Hong Kong's sixty-one
magistrates had been unlawfully appointed, thereby raising serious
questions about the validity of their past rulings.72 The original
69 See Jon Marsh, Emotional Hour that Left a Man Devastated, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 20, 1990, at 6.
70 See Lindy Course, Bar Society Memo Questions A-G's Standing, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 22, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Course, Bar Society Memo
Questions] (reporting that Mr. Mathews did not reveal the circumstances of Mr.
Harris' case until the chairman of the Bar inquired about the rumors
surrounding the "sudden departure").
71 See id.
72 See Lindy Course, et al., Courts in Muddle After Ruling on Magistrates, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 23, 1991, at 1 (reporting on the questionable
validity of rulings made by magistrates not properly appointed).
Scholar David J. Clark discovered this fact and published it in a 1989 article
in the HONG KONG LAW JOURNAL. See David J. Clark, Are All Appointments
of Magistrates Since January 1984 Invalid?, 19 HONG KONG L.J. 330, 333 (1989).
Dr. Clark had personally informed the legal department of this discovery,
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Letters Patent empowered only the Governor to appoint magis-
trates and judges in Hong Kong.73 In actuality, all but one of
the colony's magistrates had been dubiously appointed by the
Chief Justice since January 1984.7' Despite contrary pronounce-
ment by the Court of Appeal, the government amended the
Letters Patent to validate retroactively all of these appointments
and make the power to delegate explicit.' In effect this Amend-
ment was a vote of no-confidence in the Court of Appeal decision
contending that the power to delegate was implied.76 The
plaintiffs in this case are presently appealing to Hong Kong's
highest court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
London.7 Furthermore, the retrospective Amendment, which is
a highly undesirable and potentially dangerous attempt to
manipulate legal institutions, will set an unhealthy precedent for
the post-colonial S.A.R. Ramroding this amendment through at
breakneck speed while the appeal of the original case was still in
progress evidences the executive branch's low regard for the spirit
of legal fair play and independence of the judiciary from adminis-
trative interference.
3.6. Scope of the Problem
These cases may be only the tip of an iceberg of colonial legal
maladministration. Some of the blame has often been attributed
to the questionable judgment, leadership and character of
Attorney General Matthews. In fact, since early 1990 there have
been open calls for Mr. Matthews' resignation as a necessary step
to repair the damage inflicted on the legal system due to his
administrative and legal incompetence, sheer lack of leadership and
but in a characteristically arrogant bureaucratic reaction, no action was taken
until after the court verdict was handed down in late April 1991. See Lindy
Course, Defendants Freed on Ruling "Face Re-Arrest", S. CHINA MORNING
POST, April 24, 1991, at 1.
' See Clark, supra note 72, at 331.
71 See Crisis in Legal Department, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 9, 1991,
at 1.
7s See Jennifer Cooke, Changes Fail to Halt Privy Council Bid, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 22, 1991, at 3.
76 See Cynthia Chan, Magistrates "Validly Appointed" - Court of Appeal
Finds Governor's Power Delegable, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 15, 1991, at
7 (providing an analysis of the Court of Appeal decision).
r See Cooke, supra note 75, at 3.
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sordid personal affairs.7 The fact that he still holds the top legal
position in the colonial regime is itself testimony to the lack of
full accountability in the government.
4. PROBLEMS ON THE BENCH
The Legal Department is not alone in harboring questionable
senior personnel with serious misdeeds among its ranks. The
judicial bench has also had its fair share of dubious characters
engaging in indiscreet conduct. The following notorious cases of
four resigned or retired Court of Appeal Justices and High Court
Judges provide merely a small sampling of the many recent
scandals affecting the bench.
4.1. Questionable Resignations
In January 1987, Justice Miles Jackson-Lipkin resigned in face
of reports that he falsified his date of birth, his British Who-s Wlho
entry, and his military service records.7 9 In November 1988,
Judge Patrick O'Dea resigned under pressure after he was found
reading a novel while presiding a trial.80
In September 1987, Judge Denis Barker terminated the well-
publicized Carrian case halfway through the trial, thereby
acquitting the six defendants.8" The case had been Hong Kong's
longest commercial fraud trial, consuming more than sixty-four
weeks and forty million dollars of public funding. 2 The ques-
tionable wisdom of this seemingly bizarre move has cast a dark
shadow over the judiciary. Judge Barker escaped calls for an
explanation by resigning soon after the incident, and died shortly
thereafter.83
71 See, e.g., Course, Bar Society Memo Questions, supra note 70, at 1.
"' See Vicky Wong, Quest for an Answer to a Question of Law, S. China
Morning Post, Feb. 28, 1988, at 8.
81 See HSU, supra note 25, at 64.
8" See Lindy Course, Carrian Ruling May Be Queried, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 17, 1987, at 1.
82 See Carrian Ruling Puts Jury System on Trail, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 17, 1987, at 18.
83 See Wong, supra note 79, at 8. In March 1988, six months after this
acquittal ruling, the new Chief Justice T. L. Yang admitted that it could take
up to two years to repair the damage done to the credibility of the judiciary by
the ruling. Yang's candor in his first week in office reflected the fact that the
legacy he had inherited was so tarnished that he had little choice but to
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On September 3, 1996, Judge Brian Caird withdrew from the
Aaron Nattrass case84 on medical grounds and retracted his
earlier allegations of being improperly pressured by two fellow
judges.8" Although the internal judicial inquiry headed by
Acting Chief Justice Noel Power found no pressure had been
applied, observers criticized the inquiry as a massive "cover-up"
staged by the judiciary, leaving a host of questions unanswered.86
4.2. Ethically Questionable Conduct of the Judiciary
4.2.1. Chief Justice T L. ang-s Public Statements
The peril and predicament of Hong Kong's legal system at this
critical juncture of its transition is illustrated by even more serious
areas of dubious judiciary conduct at the highest level. Indeed,
when the new Chief Justice, T. L. Yang, took office in March
1988, he openly acknowledged the tarnished legacy and impaired
credibility of the judiciary which would take considerable time
acknowledge the seriousness and address the implications of this questionable
verdict. Though insistent that an error of judgment should not automatically
force a judge to resign, Yang believed the judiciary ought to be more conscious
of its reputation and credibility. See ChiefJustice Wiue to Clear the Judicial Air,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 22, 1988, at 20.
84 Aaron Nattrass was a New Zealander charged with fraud and deception.
s See Cliff Buddle, Inquiry into "Pressure on Judge" Claims, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1 (discussin reports of pressure applied to
Judge Caird to step down from the trial); Magdalen Chow, Crown Asks judge
Caird to Withdraw from Trial, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 28, 1996, at 1
(discussing the controversy created by this pressure).
86 See Cliff Buddle & Magdalen Chow, Second Judge Urged Nattrass Trial,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 6, 1996, at 3 (citing law lecturer Nihal
Jayawickrama as claiming that the Judiciary's actions were a "cover-up in light
of the investigation's failure to produce any evidence); Cliff Buddle, Inquiry
into Caird Should Cover Two Other Judges, Patten Told, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 26, 1996, at 3 (discussing the possibility that Judge Caird may have
been singled out as a scapegoat and suggesting that a real judicial inquiry would
be expanded to investigate other judges).
Governor Chris Patten announced his intention to set up a judicial tribunal
to investigate Judge Caird for possible impeachment and removal. However,
in December 1996, Caird took early retirement on the grounds of ill health
which the Governor approved. As such the tribunal was never set up. See
Charlotte Parsons, Caird "Forced to Quit for Telling Truth", S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at 3 (discussing Caird's retirement for medical
reasons and noting that this would preclude any further official investigation).
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and effort to repair." He stressed the need for the judiciary to
be more conscious of its public reputation and that it should be
"open to scrutiny and yet beyond reproach."8 Yet in the case
of the illegal appointment of magistrates, it was the Chief Justice
himself" who actually appointed them." Rather than uphold-
ing a much needed system of checks and balances in a supposedly
accountable system under the rule of law, the illegal appointment
of magistrates made a farce of the supposed separation of pow-
ers.9
1
4.2.2. The ChiefJustice's Actions to the Contrary
In the controversy over the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group's
("JLG") agreement regarding the composition of Hong Kong's
Court of Final Appeal,' the stance of then Chief Justice T.L.
Yang provoked considerable criticism from the legal profession
and the Hong Kong public.'3 In essence, the JLG's 1991 agree-
ment would restrict the number of overseas jurists who could be
appointed to the five-member Court of Final Appeal to only one,
even though the provisions in the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law contained no such restriction. 4  The Hong Kong public
regarded this Beijing-London deal, which completely failed to take
account of public interest and sentiment, as a great disappointment
that would undermine the rule of law after 1997.9s Public
opinion favors greater flexibility in the appointment of overseas
jurists to the Court of Final Appeal in order to provide more
17 See Public Confidence: Lifeblood of fudiciary, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 16, 1988, at 9 [hereinafter Public Confidence].
88 Id.
s' The Chief Justice is also the chairman of the Judicial Service Commis-
sion which advises on these judicial appointments.
o See discussion, supra section 3.5.
n See Public Confidence, supra note 87, at 9.
The Court of Final Appeal was supposed to replace the Privy Council's
Judicial Committee in London as the final and highest judiciary authority for
Hong Kong legal cases. It was scheduled to come into existence in 1993, ahead
of the 1997 sovereignty retrocession. See Wh4y the Final Court is a Disap-
pointment, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 28, 1991, at 14.
93 See id.
9' See Margaret Ng, Hong Kong Has Been Cheated Over the Rule of Law
After 1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at 5.
95 See id.
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experience and entrenchment.96
The councils of the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Hong
Kong Law Society jointly condemned this agreement as a "recipe
for disaster" and the JLG's action as "indefensible." 7  In fact, a
majority of Legislative Council members, who will have to
approve legislation empowering the establishment of the Court of
Final Appeal, rejected this agreement in a motion debate.9" As
such, it was both premature and inappropriate for the head of the
judiciary to issue a public statement endorsing this controversial
JLG model as "workable and acceptable"" immediately after its
announcement by the government. It is highly undesirable for
the Chief Justice to involve himself directly in political maneuvers
and play the role of an appeasing diplomat supporting a highly
problematic deal between the executive branches of Hong Kong's
current and future sovereign regimes.00
96 See Shirley Yam, Plea to Hurd on HKAffairs, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 30, 1991, at 7 ("Legislators have rejected the agreement ... on the ground
that it restricts the court's flexibility in inviting overseas judges.").
"' See Final Appeal Court "Recipe for Disaster S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 14, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Recipe for Disaster].
98 In their in-house meeting on October 25, 1991, thirty-eight Legco
members supported, two opposed and five abstained from a motion calling for
greater flexibility in the Court' s composition. See Doreen Cheung, Call to
Reconsider Court Agreement, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 4
(providing details of the vote); Fanny Wong, "Go it Alone" Call on Court:
Legislators Vow No Compromise in Row on Deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 1, 1991, at 1 (suggesting that flexibility "concerning the composition and
powers of the Court" is consistent with the Joint Declaration and Basic Law).
" Recipe for Disaster, supra note 97, at 1 (citing the Chief Justice's com-
ments).
100 The conflict over the final composition of the Court escalated to a
constitutional crisis between the Legco and the colonial administration
harboring serious implications for Sino-British relations and for the S.A.R. legal
system. This controversy over the Court of Final Appeal's composition on
which both the P.R.C. and British authorities refused to retreat is another
example of the many causes of deep reservation among the people of Hong
Kong about the continued functioning of the common law system in post-1997
Hong Kong. See "No Surrender" Impasse Over Appeal Court Deal With China,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 1991, at 26.
The final resolution of this Court of Final Appeal issue came in June 1996,
when both London and Beijing agreed to defer tlie establishment of the court
until July 1, 1997. The obvious implication of this agreement is that by then
it would be a task for the S.A.R. alone. On July 26, 1995, the Hong Kong
government finally managed to pass a bill in the Legco to establish the Court
of Final Appeal. See GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES, HONG KONG
1996 29, 33 (1996).
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4.3. Improper Judicial Commentary on Human Rights Issues
The enactment of a less protective Hong Kong Bill of Rights
in the Spring of 1991, after a long delay and with a one year
freeze on six existing laws, represented British efforts to boost
local confidence during the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square
Incident. The Beijing authorities launched instant criticism of this
already weakened Bill of Rights contending that it would have
adverse effects on the Basic Law.
10 1
In 1995, in the context of this ongoing political controversy,
Chief Justice T. L. Yang interposed his personal opinion on the
Bill of Rights' unsettling impact on the legal system.02 Specifi-
cally, the Chief Justice cited concerns arising from potential
conflicts between the Basic Law's commands regarding transition
and the resurrection of six local ordinances before their amend-
ment by the 1991 Bill of Rights.0 3  The damage was done not
101 See Dorothy Lai, Activists Rattled by Police Action, S. CHNA MORNING
POST, June 6, 1991, at 1 (discussing human rights activists' reaction to this
criticism by Beijing authorities). This alarmed the Hong Kong public as further
evidence reflecting Beijing's rather low regard for the safeguard of civil liberties
in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
which the P.R.C. is not a signatory. See Lee Fails in Bid to Stop Freeze of Bill,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 7, 1991, at 6 (stating concerns that enactment
of the bill may not effectively protect the "rights and freedoms of Hong Kong
people after 1997").
More recently, a new international controversy has arisen over the
P.R.C.'s S.A.R. Preparatory Committee Legal Sub-group's call for the
.restoration" of several major ordinances to their more draconian pre-Bill of
Rights-amended, versions after July 1, 1997. Specifically, this would mean the
resurrection of the pre-1995 version of the Public Order Ordinance with very
tight police control over public demonstration and assembly, and the pre-1992
Societies Ordinance banning foreign links with local political organizations as
well as the toning down or outright deletion of some provisions of the Bill of
Rights for contravening the Basic Law according to Beijing's interpretation.
This has drawn criticism from local legal bodies, -he pro-democracy [obby and
human rights groups as well as the U.S. and U.K. governments as undermining
the civil liberty and social freedoms for the people in Hong Kong S.A.R. See,
e.g., Simon Beck, U.S. Appeal on Bill of Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
23, 1997, at 4 (quoting U.S. spokesman Nicholas Bums as expressing concerns
regarding "attempts to weaken civil liberties and basic freedoms in Hong
Kong").
102 See Berry Hsu, Judicial Development of Hong Kong on the Eve of 1 July
1997, in THE HONG KONG READER: PASSAGE TO CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY 65,
82 & n.76 (Ming K. Chan & Gerard A. Postiglione eds. 1996).
103 See Chris Yeung, Sparks Fly as Chief Justice States Case, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 1 (providing details of Yang's expressed
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simply because Yang expressed doubts about the overriding effect
of the Bill of Rights in a "private" conversation as overheard by
a Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the New China
News Agency (the P.R.C.'s de facto consulate).1 4  The most
alarming aspect is that Yang apparently violated judicial indepen-
dence by bowing to executive pressure and submitting a report
explaining his views to Chief Secretary 
Chan on this issue.
10
4.4. Scope of the Problem
The above instances provide only a few of the more recent
examples of dubious conduct or impropriety on the part of senior
legal officials who did little to enhance public confidence in the
British-style legal system and, by extension, the rule of law itself.
If the court system is regarded by the populace as the last resort
for fairness and justice, then the Legal Department together with
the police force must be the front line of public protection for
upholding law and order. Thus, the tarnished image and serious
misdeeds of those in positions of authority, responsibility, and
public trust while supposedly only involving private misconduct
nevertheless reflects negatively on the institutions they represent
and the public functions they were entrusted to discharge. In a
sense, as public officials there is very little room for a private
persona consisting of illegal and unethical behavior. It is indeed
tragic that these high legal and judicial officials who are called
upon to be a personification of the institutions of justice have
proven to be smaller than the offices they held. In addition to
widespread headlines regarding the "crisis of legal personnel
scandals" is the realization that most of these cases involved
expatriate, non-Chinese legal personnel, thus adding to the public
perception, perhaps not fully informed, of the double standard in
the legal system. A greater effort in localization and bilingualism
in legal processes may reduce part of the stigma, but a better and
more vigorous system of recruitment and appointment to both the
Legal Department and Judicial Branch will be indispensable to any
successful future legal system in the S.A.R.
concerns).
104 See id.
'0' See Hsu, supra note 102, at 82.
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5. CONCLUSION: THE UNCERTAIN LEGAL PROSPECT FOR
POST-COLONIAL HONG KONG
The sordid record of legal irregularities and disorderly legal
administration completely undermines any argument for the full
and intact preservation of the existing legal system as handed
down by the colonial regime without fundamental reform.
Despite British claims that they brought the blessings of the rule
of law to Hong Kong, as in many other colonies, the British have
in fact created a legal system emphasizing law and order while
neglecting the personal liberties and individual rights associated
with the common law tradition. Hong Kong's legal system
reflects a concentration rather than separation of powers and non-
accountability rather than checks and balances. When coupled
with a non-representative administration, this creates a formidable
problem of legitimacy for the legal system as part of the political
and constitutional superstructure.
Widespread public concern about the Basic Law's potential
negative effects on the S.A.R. legal system should not obstruct a
more critical assessment of the existing legal institutions, proce-
dures, and personnel under British rule. As set forth in the 1984
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, an independent
and impartial judiciary will provide an indispensable safeguard for
civil liberties and human rights, as well as provide a forum to
regulate economic behavior and public conduct according to the
rule of law."0 With the P.R.C.'s own dubious legal record, it
is imperative that the British provide a sound foundation, both
institutional and societal, during the transitional years to assure
the continuation of common law justice in post-1997 Hong Kong.
Historically, a lack of public trust was the main reason for the
failure of the common law system in many other former British
colonies. There is a real danger of repetition of such failure not
only because of external pressure but also stemming from internal
decay. The British colonial regime has done little to build
confidence in the common law system in Hong Kong. The
readiness of the local Chinese populace to accept common law
notions is not sufficient to guarantee the success of the common
law as the foundation for a future of legal justice and the protec-
106 See generally BLUEPRiNT FOR "STABILITY?", supra note 2 (providing
analysis of the Basic Law's provisions on human rights and civil liberties,
principles that could be enforced by a properly functioning rule of law).
[Vol. 18:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss1/9
IMPERFECT LEGA CY
tion of citizens' rights.
Therefore, if the common law system folds after 1997, the
fault will lie not with the Hong Kong people, or traditional
Chinese authoritarian culture, as much as with the British colonial
administration's failure to strengthen the legal system in Hong
Kong. Moreover, the government has not provided the populace
with a better understanding of the existing common law system
and the active role they need to perform in maintaining it and
holding it truly accountable. This is not only an indictment of
the legal system, but of the political and educational systems as
well. In this sense, the colonial regime has failed to adequately
prepare and empower the Hong Kong people for their future.
The long separation of colonial bureaucratic polity from the
Chinese society in Hong Kong has also had implications for the
common law system and its grafting onto Chinese culture. The
insulation of the expatriate-dominated Legal Department is certain
to aggravate rather than alleviate this problem. Given the deeply
rooted decay within the Legal Department and the uncertain fate
of the common law system after 1997, the attitudes of the people
toward the common law are a critically important element for
local autonomy following the resumption of Chinese sovereignty.
At this critical juncture, the Hong Kong people should further
reflect on their own views of the common law system inherited
from the colonial government.
While the P.R.C.'s own legal system and record of justice is
far from reassuring, the colonial legacy leaves far too many
blemishes to provide a shining example or a perfect foundation for
the further development of the rule of law in the S.A.R. The rule
of law is definitely a prominent British legacy in Hong Kong, and
is rightly viewed as such by popular perception. 0 7 However,
one can never forget the serious lapses and significant gaps in the
common law system as practiced by the colonial regime. Many
efforts are still crucial to effective reform of the defects and
inadequacies of the legal system so that it can live up to its own
avowed objective. The official government report on the Hong
Kong Judiciary aptly articulates the proper goals and rationales of
107 In a Hong Kong Policy Viewers' poll published in October 1996,
more than 90% of 560 respondents stated that maintaining judicial indepen-
dence and safeguarding Hong Kong's autonomy should be the top priority of
the future S.A.R. chief executive. See Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-97 List
Survey Shows, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 5.
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these reform efforts: [i]f th people of Hong Kong are to have
confidence in their judicial system, the courts must be seen to be
capable of dispensing justice independently, within a reasonable
period of time and in a language which the vast majority of
people can understand.0 8
In retrospect, many factors have contributed to Hong Kong's
remarkable development and success as an economically prosper-
ous, socially free, and increasingly more democratic polity. A
most crucial and indispensable component of this success is
undoubtedly the territory's legal system and framework which has
provided stability and certainty to support Hong Kong's growth
and transformation. Yet, there is the undeniable shadow of past
defects in the colonial legal history. In fact, few would dare to
argue that the British rule of law has throughout the past one and
a half centuries of colonialism been genuinely fair, delivering equal
justice to all, Europeans or Chinese. This Article documents the
cases of misconduct and impropriety involving legal personnel or
malfunctioning of legal institutions. However, the truly funda-
mental concerns of the Hong Kong S.A.R. populace transcend the
remedial measures necessary to improve upon the British endowed
legal system. Rather, the crux of the issue is whether the Hong
Kong legal system will be able to enjoy the autonomy promised
by both the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. 9
In the final analysis, it is only with such autonomy that the rule
of law will be able to play its indispensable role in safeguarding
freedom, democracy, and the much cherished pluralistic values and
way of life that the Hong Kong people have enjoyed. Hopefully,
the past blemishes of the British colonial regime's legal system will
not become the pretext used by external and internal forces to
undermine the rule of law in the S.A.R.
10' HONG KONG JUDICIARY, supra note 31, at 18.
109 For an analysis of the issues and problems in legal institutions in the last
years of British rule, which will also be a basic concern for the new S.A.R.
administration, see generally Alison Conner, Legal Institutions in Transitional
Hong Kong, in HONG KONG's REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA: TRANSFORMA-
TION AND CHALLENGE (Ming K. Chan ed., forthcoming 1997).
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